| HTTP requests | tool_calls.allowed: http plus http.allowed_methods, http.blocked_methods, and http.allowed_hosts | Typed method and host checks |
| Action-specific field allowlist | allow_only[action=<pattern>].<field> <operator>: | Scoped matching with exact or pattern operators |
| Trusted metadata | Add attested to a metadata allow rule | Requires shim-derived provenance |
| MCP server or tool access | ## mcp with allowed_servers, allowed_tools, or blocked_tools | MCP is deny-by-default without this block |
| Human approval | require_approval action patterns in the governing block | Returns PENDING with a durable hold |
| Aggregate count or spend | ## soft_limits named cap.<name>.* fields | Enforced after base policy approval |
| Runaway tool loop | ## execution_limits | Hard denial before the next call |
| Repository writes | ## repository plus ## filesystem | Component-aware roots, blocked paths, sensitive-file classes, and impact ceilings |
| Git history and hosted providers | ## git plus provider metadata | Full ref topology, fast-forward rules, provider operation taxonomy, and approval gates |
| Production database effects | ## database | Explicit SQL effects, resource allowlists, routine catalogs, read-only transactions, and timeouts |
| Exact inbound MCP tool results | Policy 2.2.0, exact mcp.response.* mappings, and optional custom.response.deny_string | Local deterministic ALLOW or BLOCK in an inspection-enabled Sigil MCP Proxy |